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An Experimental Study of Executive DecisionMaking with Implications for Decision Support
Terence T. Ow

Marquette University, Milwaukee, WI

James G. Morris

University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI

Abstract
Past research in the field of information systems has explored factors and conditions that are relevant to
decision-making in many contexts. However, very little is known about how executives consider, weigh, and
integrate these factors. One current school of thought holds that intuition and instincts can play a significant
role and that when decision-makers use their instincts, they rely on only a relatively small subset of the cues
available to them. This has implications for designing and improving decision support systems, which form a
major and widespread element of modern organizational computing. We examine the decision-making policies
of professional decision-makers. High-level information technology executives were asked to evaluate the
likelihood of making a strategic investment in the face of varying environmental scenarios. Using policycapturing methodology, we find differences between what the executives thought was important to their

decision-making and what is revealed as actually being important. In addition, we find that personal
characteristics of risk-taking propensity and innovativeness affect the way the decision-makers integrate
information. We argue that the idiosyncratic nature of the executive-environment relationship calls for
increased emphasis on developing suitably adapted decision support systems (e.g., business intelligence
systems) for executive decision-making.

Keywords:
adaptive thinking, bounded rationality, business intelligence, cognitive modeling, decision-making, decision
support systems, innovativeness, policy-capturing, risk-taking propensity

1. INTRODUCTION
One thing that social psychology taught us over and over is that the mind is a wonderful sense-making
device, that it takes ambiguous or confusing information and simplifies it according to rules of thumb. 1
According to Gartner [2], the expected 2010 expenditure in information technology (IT) will be around US $3.35
trillion with expected growth in software, information technology services, and telecommunications. We use
this context as a backdrop for our study of how executives combine available environmental factors to make the
associated strategic decisions related to an organization's investments. Some researchers suggest that decisionmakers rationally examine a full set of factors and optimize subject to constraints, but others have reported that
only a portion of the information available is actually used by executives when they make decisions because of
their inherent cognitive limitations. Hence, collecting information that seems important to a decision does not
necessarily mean that it is actually used during the decision-making process [3]. For example, when executives
were asked to make a decision regarding collaborative technology, they exhibited cognitive limitations in
weighing and integrating the available information during the evaluation process [4].
Others propose that decision-makers actually use gut instincts based on simple rules of thumb that are highly
effective [5, 6]. This would mean executives intuitively process key environmental cues and ignore other
unnecessary information to their great advantage. Human intelligence is seen as an adaptive toolbox. This topic
represents a critical issue for organizations. As Finkelstein et al. [7, p. 49] asserted, “If we wish to understand the
strategic choices and performance of organizations … we must examine and understand their top executives.”
However, “little is currently known about what information executives use … or how executives' beliefs or
mental models affect the assessments they are asked to make on behalf of the firm” [4, p.44].
The study is intended to help answer the basic question, “What is the decision-maker doing with the information
available?” [8]. To do so, we focus on executive decision-making behaviors by using a context of possible
investment in information technology in which the intent is strategic in nature. The methodology of policycapturing is used here because it is particularly appropriate for understanding what is important to decisionmakers instead of accepting what they say or think is important. This simulation-based experimental approach
presents the executive with a series of decision situations in which the strengths of the environmental factors
(cues) varied in contrast to reliance on a survey approach that would collect only self-perceptions of how
decisions are made with the consequent biases. For example, persons tend to overestimate the relative
importance of minor factors when self-reporting [9] because they do not have insight into their own decisionmaking processes [10]. Previous studies have shown that the additive linear model employed in the policycapturing method used here is able to measure the relationship between an individual's decisions and the
criteria he or she used [11, 12].
In short, this paper reports on our exploration of how top executives combine the information presented. What
information influences them when they ponder their decision? Do all of the environmental factors really matter,

or is it just that the decision-makers think they all matter? How do the individual characteristics of these
executives affect the way they view these factors? In addition, we explore how the risk-taking propensity and
innovation characteristics of the decision-makers explain differences that we observed in their decision
behaviors. Armed with this information, designers can improve the effectiveness of decision support systems
(DSS), such as those in the business intelligence realm.
We next present the framework of our research and the attendant hypotheses. Then, we describe the
methodology we used for this research. Finally, we present our analysis and discussion and end with a
consideration of implications for research and practice.

2. RESEARCH FRAMEWORK
Finkelstein and Hambrick [13, p. 39] observed that “At odds with most strategy frameworks in textbooks, top
executives do not deal in a world of tidily packaged, verifiable external and internal phenomena. Even if they
were to conduct in-depth comprehensive analysis, they would often arrive at widely differing conclusions
because strategic situations are not knowable, they are only interpretable… . If bounded rationality
characterizes executive decision-making, then it is important to understand how this ‘boundedness’ occurs.”
When asked what is wrong with the classical rational approach, Gigerenzer (quoted in [14]) replied: “In some
situations, that demands too much information. Plus, it's slow. When a person relies on their gut feelings and
uses the instinctual rule of thumb ‘go with your first best feeling and ignore everything else,’ it can permit them
to outperform the most complex calculations.” In a similar vein, in his presidential address Akerlof [15] called for
inclusion of human motivation in economic reasoning: “The Keynesians based their models on their observation
of motivations, rather than on abstract derivations. If there is a difference between real behavior and behavior
derived from abstract preferences, New Classical economics has no way to pick up those differences. In contrast,
models with norms based on observation will systematically incorporate such behavior—although, of course, as
with any method, there is the possibility for error.” 2
To examine the executives' decision policies, we presented them with a spare set of environmental factors.
Surely a great many additional factors could be used. The purpose of this study, however, is not to identify the
best factor set but to present an effective set in order to apply the policy-capturing methodology to uncover
decision-making behavior. The study is further motivated by the upper echelon theory proposed by Hambrick
and Mason [16] that suggests that strategic choices have a large behavioral component and reflect the
idiosyncrasies of executives' biases and values. They argued that these biases and values filter and distort the
perceptions of the decision-maker and, as a result, affect strategic choice. Therefore, organizational outcomes,
such as strategic choices, are partially predicted by managerial background characteristics. The Finkelstein and
Hambrick [13] model of human limits on strategic choice examines how decision-makers view the strategic
situation as represented by such factors as events and trends inside and outside the organization relative to the
strategic choice itself. In between, there is the executive orientation that serves as a basis for how the executive
interprets the situation and decides a course of action.

3. ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS
The set of decision cues considered here consists of four environmental factors: Anticipated Market Turmoil,
Integration and Interaction with Supply Chain Partners, Information Systems Sophistication and Maturity, and
Business and Organization Transformation. The first two factors relate to the external environment, and the
next two relate to the internal environment. Gigerenzer [18, p. 168] emphasized the importance of creating a
natural decision-making environment to draw valid conclusions from our study:
Simon emphasized that minds are adapted to real world environments. “Human rational behavior is
shaped by a scissors whose two blades are the structure of task environments and the computational

capabilities of the actor” [19, p. 7]. For the most part, however, theories of human inference have
focused exclusively on the cognitive side, equating the notion of bounded rationality with the statement
that humans are limited information processors, period… . Simon's insight that the minds of living
systems should be understood relative to the environment in which they evolved, rather than the tenets
of classical rationality, has had little impact so far in research on human inference.

3.1 Anticipated Market Turmoil

Market turmoil is a characterization of the anticipated business environment and is commonly known in the
research literature as environmental uncertainty. Market turmoil can be measured by the rate of change of the
industry, degree of threat from competitors, changes in customers' taste and demand, and the variety of the
products offered in the market. Researchers in strategic information systems consider environmental turmoil as
an important factor of strategic information systems use. “One of the major problems confronting strategic
management is that the external environments of many firms have become increasingly turbulent where
prevailing environmental information is often highly complicated, novel, ambiguous, or dynamic” [20, p. 33].
Companies in uncertain environments may deal with the uncertainty by increasing their information-processing
capability and creating inter-organizational links [21].
Market turmoil is studied in detail in the organizational behavior literature on technology innovation and
diffusion. Oliver [22] stated that low levels of uncertainty increase the tendency of an organization to remain
stable and avoid changes. Such organizations are comfortable and confident in their ability to produce future
returns and maintain the status quo [23]. Others contend that managers have a strong need for certainty and
stability [24]. An environment that is low in uncertainty (i.e., low in market turmoil) provides managers with the
luxury of avoiding the selection of major strategic directives. This is also consistent with models of organizational
reorientation and transformation, which show that in the face of a high degree of certainty, organizations do not
adopt new patterns of behavior [25, 26]. During periods of high uncertainty, stakeholders take an active position
to pressure management to adopt strategies involving changes in technology and innovation [27].

3.2 Integration and Interaction with Supply Chain Partners
Porter and Millar [28] asserted that an organization that intends to gain competitive advantage through
information technology must understand not just the technology, but also the value chain in which the
organization operates. Improving the effectiveness of the value chain involves optimizing and changing the
relationship between upstream and downstream partners. Information technology is transforming the way
value activities are performed and the nature of the linkages among them. The value chain includes inputs such
as information, as well as supplies and services, to the organization. Another component of the value chain is
the collection of internal activities of the organization to produce goods and services. The final value chain
component is the distribution channel, which is where IT plays a critical role in providing information on each
activity of the value chain. Close interaction and integration with supply chain upstream and downstream
partners can enable rapid adoption of complex IT initiatives through intense use of telecommunications.
Telecommunications help organizations share information continually with vendors and suppliers, such as
requisitions for availability of products, or provide information regarding inventory levels of a product.
Therefore, the supplier can align operations according to product sales.
The interconnectivity achieved through the Internet between and within organizations allows communication
with vendors in any location. Critical information can be made available for time-sensitive transactions. The
ability to track orders and inventory online helps ensure that delivery dates are kept. Organizations derive
reductions in costs and increases in efficiency by using the Internet to deal directly with suppliers.

3.3 Information Systems Sophistication and Maturity

The level of sophistication of information technology in an organization can be measured by the capability of the
organization to accept and adopt emerging technology. It also can be measured based on the organizational
level for software process improvement and the extent of the organization's IT and telecommunications
infrastructure [29]. Neo [30] found that technical expertise was one of the major facilitators in an organization's
decision to consider IT application for strategic purposes. Lack of experience in IT has been found to inhibit an
organization's decision to use IT applications for strategic purposes [31]. King et al. [32] also identified strong
technical support and expertise, plus leadership position in IT, as important organizational facilitators in the
investment and development of strategic applications of IT. King and Teo [31] found that internal factors, such
as technical expertise, IT facilities, and organizational innovation, play a stronger role than external factors, such
as market uncertainty and competition. Increasing convergence of telecommunications and IT suggests that
mature IS groups tend to advocate evaluation and implementation of telecommunications technologies [33].
Grover [34] also found that the success of adopting inter-organizational systems is particularly attributable to a
technological orientation that includes compatibility of technology and company experience in adopting new IT.

3.4 Business and Organization Transformation
Venkatraman [35] proposed several degrees of business transformation for an organization. Low degrees of
transformation include localized exploitation of internal integration; higher degrees of transformation are those
of business process redesign, business network redesign, and business scope redefinition. Venkatraman
indicated that the real power of information technology lies in restructuring the relationship of the extended
business networks so that they deliver better products and services. For example, telecommunications
infrastructure is seen to be the primary contributor to reducing the cost of coordinating various activities and
improving performance for the newly redesigned process.
From their experience in studying four firms, Broadbent et al. [36] concluded that radical firm-wide business
process transformation requires substantial infrastructure capabilities to address the multiple cross-business
process changes. These capabilities include the ability to span organizational boundaries and the ability to reach
inside and outside the firm to transfer information and perform complex business transactions. They also
contended that at least a basic level of IT infrastructure is needed to implement business process redesign. IT
infrastructure is an enabler for change [37, 38]. It can also be a constraint or inhibitor because of its limitations
and inflexibility [39]. In some firms, excellent returns on significant investment in an enabling infrastructure
were realized when the business process design was implemented. Also, inadequate infrastructure capability,
resulting in the delay of process change implementation, provided “a business-driven case for infrastructure
investments.” Firms that have developed higher levels of IT infrastructure capabilities before or concurrently
with the undertaking of business transformation, in the form of business process redesign, were able to
implement extensive changes in their business processes over a relatively short time [36].
The environmental factors employed in our study were intentionally interpreted at a general level. This is
because more specific interpretations would likely lead to differing interpretations among the executives. For
example, if we were to indicate a specific level of Anticipated Market Turmoil, some participants might interpret
that level as high, moderate, or low, depending on their industries, current situations, personalities, or other
specific idiosyncratic references. The use of terminology such as “high level” for a factor is the norm in policycapturing studies. To the extent that different interpretations may be an issue, they would tend to attenuate
findings. So, if there were any significant results, even in the face of potential attenuation, one can place even
greater confidence in the findings.
Based on the presented rationale for the included environmental factors, we expect that they will be important
to executives' IT decisions. To draw valid conclusions about executives not using all the factors presented, all

factors have to potentially matter to the overall group of participants. This required testing the following
enabling hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1. The environmental factors of Anticipated Market Turmoil, Integration and Interaction with
Supply Chain Partners, Information Systems Sophistication and Maturity, and Business and Organization
Transformation will affect the executives' IT investment decisions.
Long ago, Ackoff [40] inveighed against false assumptions underpinning early information systems, one of which
is that managers need the information they want. As Tyler and Steensma [4, p. 44] later noted, “collecting
information important to a decision does not necessarily mean that it will actually be used … executives develop
their own interpretations or mental understandings, largely based on prior experience … [and] they use these to
seek and filter information.” Djamasbi [41] found that decision-makers in a positive mood used a greater
number of informational cues provided by the decision support system and made more accurate judgments
than a control group of participants. Other work by decision theorists [42–44] suggests that executives do not
follow a wholly rational model in making strategic decisions. In sum, decision-makers may not use available
information or interpret information correctly. Therefore, it is expected that the executives will lack effective
insight into their own decision-making processes. In particular, they will likely conclude that more factors were
important than they actually use in the decision-making process [45, 46]. Accordingly, we tested the following
hypotheses.
Hypothesis 2A. Executives will tend to use less than the full set of environmental factors in making their
IT investment decisions.
Hypothesis 2B. Executives will tend to think they used more of the environmental factors in IT
investment decisions than they actually used.

4. PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS
As Finkelstein and Hambrick [13, p. 46] noted, “Psychological constructs have the advantage of conceptual
clarity and, perhaps more important, provide a pointed causal link to the executive behaviors or choices being
explained.” Furthermore, Pierce and Delbecq [47] found that most innovation process models start with a
cognition component, which is an awareness of a need or opportunity for change followed by ideation and
decision phase. We considered the effects of the personal characteristics of innovativeness and risk-taking
propensity on the decision-making behaviors of executives.

4.1 Innovativeness

Decision-makers may differ significantly in their attitudes toward technology adoption and in their inherent
resistance to change. Individuals who are highly innovative are more eager to experiment with new ideas and
have a more favorable attitude toward change and are, therefore, quicker to adjust to uncertainties and
ambiguities than those lower on the innovativeness scale [48, 49].
At the individual level, studies have shown that innovativeness of the decision-maker is an important
determinant of the success of IT innovation [50]. Attitudes favorable to change play an important role in
predicting organizational innovation [51–53]. Early work by Cummings [54] indicated that the innovation and
creative behavior of top management plays a critical role in the utilization of the innovative capability of an
organization. Hage and Dewar [52] demonstrated that the innovation and creative behavior of the decisionmaker explains more of the variance in innovation than any single dimension of organizational structure. Pierce
and Delbecq [47] proposed that the innovative and creative behavior of individual decision-makers is a
moderating effect in the organization-innovation relationship. The “psychological flexibility” of the individual
plays an important role in the assumption of low-risk and high-risk services. Kaluzny et al. [51] and Kaplan [55]

found that those who manifest such psychological flexibility have a higher proportion of program innovations in
the health care industry. The following hypotheses are advanced concerning the moderating effect of the
decision-maker's level of innovativeness.
Hypothesis 3A. The innovativeness of executives moderates the relationship between the environmental
factors and the likelihood of investing in IT.
Hypothesis 3B. The implied weights associated with each of the environmental factors differ between
the executives who are more innovative and those who are less innovative.

4.2 Risk-Taking Propensity

Strategic decisions are affected by the risk-taking propensity of the decision-maker [56]. For example, the risktaking nature of top management plays a significant role in the successful adoption of computer-based interorganizational systems (CIOS). The organizations that are more likely to adopt CIOS have aggressive
management and are willing to take financial, managerial, and organizational risks [34].
March [57] held that persons are normally elevated to decision-making positions because of past successes that
led to increased confidence in their wisdom, insight, and ability to handle future events. Payne et al. [58] and
Singh [59] determined that risk-taking propensity varies with the relationship between an individual decisionmaker's experiences of successes and failures. The effect of failure to take risks depends on whether decisionmakers focus attention on their hopes or their fears [60, 61]. Gupta [62] asserted that executives are willing to
take more risks and have a higher tolerance for ambiguity than the general population; Gupta and Govindarajan
[63] found that executives' willingness to take risks was related to their strategies to advance business
objectives.
O'Neill et al. [23] suggested that firms that are comfortable and confident in their ability to produce future
returns remain with the status quo. Also, institutional theorists contend that managers have a strong need for
certainty and stability [24]. An environment that is stable provides managers the luxury of avoiding the selection
of major strategic initiatives and directives. For example, an investment in IT would force the organization to
adjust to newer relationships with its supply chain partners, disrupting their stable relationship in the process.
Thus, decision-makers with lower levels of risk-taking propensities prefer the status quo, but decision-makers
with higher risk-taking propensities will examine the opportunity to take advantage of any strategic initiative.
The following hypotheses are advanced concerning the moderating effect of decision-makers' levels of risktaking propensity.
Hypothesis 4A. The risk-taking propensities of executives moderate the relationship between the
environmental factors and the likelihood of IT investing.
Hypothesis 4B. The implied weights associated with each of the environmental factors differ between
executives with higher risk-taking propensities and those with lower risk-taking propensities.
The research model developed here is illustrated in Figure 1, showing the factors and the moderating effects of
personal characteristics.

Figure 1 The proposed research model.

5. METHODOLOGY
In order to avoid portraying a routine decision context with a simple solution or a situation in which standard
net present value analysis would be seen as settling the issue, we needed a strong judgmental element.
Therefore, we invoked an information technology investment scenario endowed with a strategic intent.
Specifically, for a given series of experimental scenarios, the executives were asked to indicate the likelihood of
making a multimillion dollar strategic investment in telecommunications infrastructure.

5.1 Study Design
We used policy-capturing to test our hypotheses. Vignettes describing the intensities of the internal and external
environmental conditions were used to avoid problems with internal and external validity [64]. Policy-capturing
results are able to replicate real-world experiments [65] and are able to provide a within-subject assessment of
the factors associated with an individual's decision-making process. The policy-capturing technique reveals
salient variables (or lack thereof) in the judgment and decision-making of the individual, obviating the need for
subjective assessments of factor importance by the participants themselves. Krausz [66] asserted that using
regression analysis to determine the importance of factors for decision-making was more objective than explicit
self-reporting ratings. Policy-capturing also measures the consistency with which the individual adheres to these
relationships during the simulated decision-making process.
Rather than providing far more information than can be absorbed, we limited the available information as a
conservative test of the possible effects of bounded rationality or gut feelings while still providing enough
information for the executives to seriously participate in the decision-making exercise. Hence, we did not
consider all factors that are referenced in the IT adoption literature. Instead, we provided a limited set of four
salient environmental factors for the executives to consider. If these accomplished IT decision-makers relied on
less than this set of factors, we have support for their reliance on an evolved heuristic reasoning—a rationality
that is ecological, meaning good decisions are made with little information based on structures in the
environment [5]. On a more practical basis, including more factors and still achieving the required statistical
stability would require the executives to evaluate too many scenarios given their voluntary participation.

5.2 Procedure

Respondents were first asked to review the definitions of the four factors used to depict the environment. (See
Appendix A for the instructions given to the participants.) Before their participation in the policy-capturing
exercise, the executives were asked to assign Likert-like scores ranking the importance about the factors to be
considered (with 7 for important and 1 for unimportant).
To frame the policy-capturing exercise, the magnitude of investment considered was estimated to be at least
$10 million. At the heart of the instrument was a series of vignettes that consisted of 40 hypothetical investment
scenarios. These scenarios were constructed to vary the levels of the four environmental factors. The
respondents were asked to indicate the likelihood of investing for each of the scenarios presented.

Twenty-seven scenarios were constructed to evaluate the influence of the four factors by using a fractional
factorial experimental design. Ten of these scenarios were replicated and included in the exercise. These
replicated scenarios were used primarily to check the consistency of the respondents in their evaluations of the
scenarios. In addition, three scenarios were included in the beginning for “warm-up” to allow familiarization
with the exercise. Therefore, each executive was to evaluate a total of 40 scenarios. 3
Respondents were asked to consider the levels of the factors for each scenario and then provide an assessment
of the likelihood of investment in telecommunications infrastructure on a 5-point scale. An example of such a
scenario appears in Figure 2. The exercise requires participants to make trade-offs among the factors so as to
simulate real-world situations [65].
Figure 2 An example of a policy-capturing scenario.

The innovativeness self-reporting survey by Hurt et al. [67] was used to measure and identify the attitude of the
decision-makers toward innovation. This 10-item scale instrument has been used in several research studies
[68–70]. The unidimensionality and reliability of the scale have been replicated in a variety of populations that
differ in age and socioeconomic status; this suggests that the scale has validity across populations [71, 72].
Livingstone and Nelson [69] indicated that the Hurt et al. scale has been found to have convergent validity with
three other scales of innovativeness: the Open Processing Scale [73], the Innovation Sub-scale of the Jackson
Personality Inventory [74], and the Kirton Adaption-Innovation Inventory [75].
The risk-taking propensity of the decision-maker is measured using the risk-taking sub-scale of the Jackson
Personality Inventory (JPI) [74]. A high scorer on the twenty TRUE/FALSE type questions will be willing to take
chances in situations with uncertain outcomes, but a low scorer will be cautious about unpredictable situations
even if there is a great reward for success. Risk taking can be defined in terms of four facets: physical risk-taking,
monetary risk-taking, social risk-taking, and ethical risk-taking [76]. The JPI scale used in this research has a high
correlation with monetary risk-taking [74].

5.3 Sample

We targeted top-level executives who were in a position to decide or influence decisions regarding investments
in IT infrastructure. They were experienced decision-makers for their organizations and, as such, they could be
expected to have a deep understanding of the strategic mission of the organization [77, 78]. The sample was
generated from four sources: Hoover's 500 companies, selected board members of a center for manufacturing
and technology from a large Midwestern university, selected speakers for an electronic commerce conference,

and selected members of the dean's advisory board of a large Midwestern university. The majority of the sample
was selected from Hoover's 500 companies, which provides information on the companies and their senior
business executives.
There were 104 responses collected from surveys sent to the various sources; 99 of these were usable. This
constituted a response rate of 18%, comparable to survey studies of this nature in the literature of information
technology. Appendix B provides an overview of the characteristics of the respondents. More than two-thirds of
the respondents were senior executives (CEO, CIO, VP, and SVP) in information technology, systems, or
telecommunications. The others were mainly executives in strategy and operations.

6. ANALYSES AND RESULTS
Before evaluating the scenarios, the executives were asked to rank on a 7-point scale their sense of the
importance about the factors in helping them reach a decision on whether to invest in telecommunications. In
these preliminary ratings of factor importance, the executives' averages were: Anticipated Market Turmoil =
5.12; Integration and Interaction with Supply Chain Partners = 5.16; Information Systems Sophistication and
Maturity = 5.44; and Business and Organization Transformation = 5.30. Standard deviations were 1.33, 1.09,
0.96, and 1.15, respectively. Clearly, the executives anticipated all of the factors to be important a priori.
The literature contains many approaches to statistical analysis of policy-capturing results. Using the
methodology of Slovic and Lichtenstein [8], we used regression analysis to determine each respondent's
individual method of combining and weighting the factors. The regression model thus constructed represents
the decision policy of the respondent. The model for decision-maker d is as follows:

𝑦𝑦𝑑𝑑 = 𝑏𝑏0𝑑𝑑 + 𝑏𝑏1𝑑𝑑 𝑥𝑥1 + 𝑏𝑏2𝑑𝑑 𝑥𝑥2 + 𝑏𝑏3𝑑𝑑 𝑥𝑥3 + 𝑏𝑏4𝑑𝑑 𝑥𝑥4

where 𝑦𝑦𝑑𝑑 is the assessment (scale response) of decision-maker 𝑑𝑑 for the 27 scenarios. Here 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the degree to
which the ith factor contributes to the decision, or in other words, the beta weight of that factor. The
relationship between each of the factors and the overall assessment is used to identify the subtle and inferential
decision processes of each respondent. In this policy-capturing analysis, an equation was constructed for each
decision-maker in contrast to the construction of an equation for a sample of subjects as is typical in empirical
work. The key aspect of the procedure is that the respondent has not been requested to explicitly state his or
her subjective assessments of the importance of the factors. Instead, the importance of each factor is inferred
from the experimental results. If a regression coefficient is statistically significant, the respondent is considered
to have used that variable in the investment decision. The respondent implicitly perceives the factor to be
influential, and the sign of this coefficient indicates the direction of the relationship.

6.1 Regression Results for the Participants

We were able to estimate the decision policies of each of the decision-makers from his or her respective
regression model. Each model reflects the respondent's own method of combining and weighting the
information cues (factors). Similar analyses examining individual judgment profiles in policy-capturing studies
are found in Martocchio and Judge [79] and Webster and Trevino [11]. Average R2 for the respondents was
69.63% with a standard deviation of 16.58%. These results are consistent with previous policy-capturing studies
with average R2 values ranging from 50% to 80% [45]. Because R2 measures the variation in assessments
explained by the factors included in the decision-making exercise, the average of 69% leaves little leeway for
error terms and additional relevant factors that were not included. Hence, Hypothesis 1 is supported in that the
included environmental factors indeed affected their decisions. Further discussion of support for Hypothesis 1 is
taken up below.

Testing the significance of the regression coefficients allows analysis of the particular ways the factors
influenced respondents. Table 1 shows the frequency of significance of the factors. Of the 99 respondents, 57
(57.6%) were influenced in their decisions by the level of Anticipated Market Turmoil in the environment. About
two-thirds of these (68.4%) are positive in sign, and the remaining 31.6% are negative. The negative sign
indicates that respondents are less likely to invest in telecommunications infrastructure in anticipation of higher
degrees of market turmoil. Forty-five respondents were influenced in their decision-making by the level of
Integration and Interaction with Supply Chain Partners. Of these 45, 91.1% of the significant coefficients are
positive in sign. The level of organizational Information Systems Sophistication and Maturity influenced 60
respondents. In this case, most (98.3%) of the significant coefficients are positive in sign. Finally, 58 respondents
considered the level of Business and Organization Transformation in their decision-making policy, of which,
77.6% of the significant coefficients are positive in sign. Therefore, all of the factors affected the decisions of a
substantial percentage of the participants; nothing indicated the presence of a factor that most executives felt
was irrelevant.
Table 1 Summary of results of significance of decision factors
Found
Positively
significant
influenced
by
by
Rater data Factor
Count
Percentage Count
Market Turmoil
57
57.6%
39
Supply Chain Partners
45
45.5%
41
IS Sophistication
60
60.6%
59
Business Transformation 58
58.6%
45

Negatively
influenced
by
Percentage Count
68.4%
18
91.1%
4
98.3%
1
77.6%
13

Percentage
31.6%
8.9%
1.6%
22.4%

Hence, the factors are all relevant 4 in this decision-making exercise, both from a statistically revealed reliance
and in a lesser fashion, from the executives’ meaningful participation. This provides further support for
Hypothesis 1.
After completing their evaluations of the various scenarios, the executives were then asked to allocate 100
points among the four environmental factors in terms of perceived importance to their decisions. As shown in
, the mean scores were all quite close to 25, which indicate the executives not only believed all of the factors
were important but also that they considered them about equal in importance.
To further pursue the relative importance of the factors, we used Hoffman's index [80], which reflects the
objective, implicit weights used by the rater. The index is defined as follows:
Table 2 Means and standard deviations for factors through direct questioning and Hoffman's weights
Direct
Decision
questioning
Exercise
Description of factors
Mean
Standard
Mean
Standard
response
deviation
response
deviation
Anticipated Market Turmoil
26.64
12.68
27.69
27.82
Integration and Interaction with Supply Chain Partners 23.60
11.72
19.18
21.66
Information Systems Sophistication and Maturity
25.72
10.97
27.90
27.64
Business and Organization Transformation
24.05
10.86
25.23
23.54

𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =

𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑2

where 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the relative weight of the ith factor for the dth rater, 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the beta weight of the ith factor, 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is
the validity coefficient of the ith factor, and 𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑2 is the squared multiple correlation coefficient for the dth rater.
Multiplication of this index by 100 allows a direct comparison with the explicit measure derived from the 100point allocation procedure. These measures are also included in.
From the decision policies generated using the regression model, we found that 22 executives used one factor,
35 of them used two factors, 28 used three factors, and 11 used all four factors. An executive is considered to
have used a factor if the beta weight corresponding to the factor is statistically significant. However, for three
executives, none of the factors were significant in their decision models. On average, an executive used 2.22
factors during the policy-capturing exercise, and about 58% of the executives used only one or two factors.
These results support Hypothesis 2A that executives will tend to rely on less than the full set of environmental
factors. Furthermore, Zedeck and Kafry [45] suggested it is possible to determine the number of factors used by
comparing the range of the subjective weights from direct questioning, to the relative weights derived from the
policy-capturing exercise. Zedeck and Kafry [45] suggested that larger standard deviations and higher ranges
(defined as max-min) for the measures implicitly derived from the decision exercise indicate that executives
used fewer factors in their decision-making strategies in the investment exercise than they reported explicitly in
their post-exercise rankings of the importance of the factors. Additional support for such a conclusion is
provided in Appendix C by a visual inspection of the histogram plotted for both sets of data. Using the data
derived from the decision-making exercise itself, the graphs show that many of the executives did not use all of
the four factors (hence the lower scores with higher frequencies). This is additional support for Hypothesis 2B,
which holds that executives will tend to think they used more of the environmental factors than they actually
did.

6.2 Cluster Analysis
The policy-capturing approach allows us to investigate whether there were certain patterns of decision making.
Similar to what was done in previous studies [9, 45], we used cluster analysis (the JAN procedure [81] is used
here) to determine whether there were discernable groupings that were based on the individual characteristics
of the respondents.
The procedure determines possible clusters by using the beta weights of the various regression models that
represent the decision policies. Two groups are created through this procedure. The average innovativeness
measure for Cluster 1 is 57.41, with a standard deviation of 6.36. The average for Cluster 2 is 54.10, with a
standard deviation of 6.12 for the same innovativeness measure. The average risk score is 13.03 for Cluster 1
and 11.26 for Cluster 2, with standard deviations of 3.61 and 4.80, respectively, for clusters 1 and 2. Both the
average innovativeness and average risk-taking propensity measures for Cluster 1 are significantly higher (p <
0.05) than those for Cluster 2. This suggests that the clustering procedure using the decision profiles created
groups that, in fact, share the same levels of risk-taking propensity and innovativeness. Therefore, executives
with lower risk-taking propensities and lower levels of innovativeness are classified as Cluster 2, and individuals
with higher risk-taking propensities and higher levels of innovativeness are classified as Cluster 1. We did not
intend to find all possible clusters. We only attempted to determine whether there were, indeed, two
discernable groups of decision policies that were related to the personal characteristics of the executives.
Appendix D contains our plot of the beta weights from both clusters across the four factors. Each of the plots
shows the beta weights for one group to be consistently higher than for the other. A summary of the beta
weights for each of the two clusters is also provided in

. Furthermore, employing Mann-Whitney statistical tests, we were able to show that the beta weights for the
executives in the first group are higher than those for the second group (p < 0.01) for all four weights.
Table 3 Beta weights of clusters

Market Turmoil
Supply Chain Partners
IS Sophistication
Business Transformation

Cluster 1 (More risk
seeking, higher
innovativeness)
Mean
0.2478
0.2718
0.3774
0.3021

Std. Dev.
0.3351
0.2785
0.2972
0.2740

Cluster 2 (More
risk averse, lower
innovativeness)
Mean
−0.4326
0.0970
0.1734
−0.3565

Std. Dev.
0.2571
0.2077
0.2357
0.3180

From the individual regression models, it is interesting to note that the beta weights corresponding to the
Anticipated Market Turmoil and Business Transformation factors are positive in the high-risk, highinnovativeness group and negative in the second group. This suggests that participants in the second group feel
that during high levels of market turmoil or business changes and transformation, it is detrimental to invest and
change the telecommunications infrastructure of the organization. Also, the beta weights for Supply Chain
Partners and IS Sophistication and Maturity factors are lower in the second group than in the first group. Hence,
the second group of respondents is more resistant toward strategic investment in telecommunications even
with high levels of Integration and Interaction with supply chain partners or with IS Sophistication and Maturity.
Therefore, we are able to provide some evidence for support of Hypothesis 3A and Hypothesis 4A that individual
characteristics (such as risk-taking propensity and innovativeness) moderate the relationship between the
environmental factors and likelihood of investing. The evidence for this support appears in terms of the weights,
i.e., the beta weights corresponding to the higher-risk/higher-innovativeness group are higher than for those of
the lower-risk/lower-innovativeness group. The positive and negative coefficients demonstrate that the two
groups view the factors differently, providing further evidence of the moderating effects of these differences.
Executives less inclined to take risks and embrace innovation are hesitant to invest in technology during periods
of high organizational transformation and high levels of market turmoil. Furthermore, the negative signs of the
coefficients indicates that, under periods of high organizational transformation and high levels of market
turmoil, some executives may resist investing in IT—even if a strategic outcome is in the balance. Zaltman and
Duncan [82, p. 85] defined this resistance to change, as shown by the negative coefficients, as “any conduct that
seems to maintain the status quo in the face of pressure to alter the status quo.” They described the degree and
strength of resistance as ranging from indifference to rejection to organized efforts to resist. The negative
coefficients seem to suggest distaste for change that new investments in telecommunications might bring. Ellen
and Bearden [83] suggested that when an individual faces a change or alteration because of perceived
environmental uncertainty and feels incapable of handling it, he or she may resist because of feelings of
inadequacy to which the anticipated change gives rise.
Support for such an explanation of executive resistance to change is found in work by DiMaggio and Powell [24]
where they stated that given a stable environment, managers have the luxury of avoiding the selection of major
strategic initiatives and directives. Therefore, executives who have a lesser propensity to take risks seek to
maintain the status quo and avoid decisions that will destabilize that status quo. Similarly, decision-makers with
higher levels of innovativeness are favorable towards change and, therefore, adjust to uncertainties and
ambiguities better than those lower on the innovativeness scale [48].

While Hypotheses 3B and 4B were both supported, the separation of participants into two clusters did not undo
support for Hypothesis 2. The average number of significant factors used by Cluster 1 was 2.23, and the average
number of significant factors for Cluster 2 was 2.0. There is no discernable difference between these outcomes
and, hence, Hypothesis 2 remains supported.

6.3 Non-response Analysis and Validity of Results
Because manufacturing and nonmanufacturing organizations may differ regarding the significance of supply
chain partners, we also examined whether their decision-makers reacted differently to the scenarios.
Furthermore, we compared data from decision-makers whose organizational IT budgets were more than $10
million with data from those with lesser budgets. As neither test yielded statistically significant results, we
conclude that our results are robust against these decision-maker categories.
Tests for possible non-response bias were also conducted. Two procedures were used. The first analyzes data
from early responses versus those from late responses, as suggested by Babbie [84], by using a late response as
a proxy for a non-response. The early/late responses analysis did not produce any statistical significance (p >
0.1). The second procedure was a chi-square test of homogeneity that uses a contingency table [85, p. 519] to
explore possible differences between the non-responding and responding organizations in terms of IT budget
and industry affiliation. The test did not uncover any evidence (p > 0.1) of response bias. Details of these
analyses are available in Appendix E.

7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This study corroborates research that shows decision-makers are unable to accurately assess the degree of
influence that various factors have on their decisions [4]. We found evidence of bounded rationality in that
executives typically used a limited number of the available environmental factors, even though executive
opinion gave the factors received nearly equal weights in importance to the decision exercise. This conclusion
remained true even when the moderating psychological characteristics were entered into the analysis. The
bounded rationality evidenced was not likely because of a “limited minds” interpretation, as these were highly
successful decision-makers. Systematic biases are unlikely explanations because every factor was important to
some of the executives, and we sampled a great diversity of executives. Certainly it was not because of an
overload of information. Gigerenzer [18, p. 168] put it thus: “Initially, the concept of bounded rationality was
only vaguely defined, often as that which is not classical economics… . We wish to do more than oppose the
Laplacean demon view. We strive to come up with something positive that could replace this unrealistic view of
mind. What are these intelligent heuristics capable of making near-optimal inference? … we propose a class of
heuristics that exhibit bounded rationality in both of Simon's sense. These ‘fast and frugal’ heuristics operate
with simple psychological principles that satisfy the constraints of limited time, knowledge and computational
might, rather than those of classical rationality … they are designed to be fast and frugal without a significant
loss of inferential accuracy, because they can exploit the structure of environments.”
Our experimental conditions called for quick turnaround on decisions because of the number of scenarios to be
considered. There was limited knowledge of the entire decision landscape, and there was an intentional
preclusion of the possibility of a straightforward resolution of the problem, such as a classical present value
computation. We believe that the executives were indeed applying versions of Gigerenzer's fast and frugal
heuristics. Certainly, in some of the scenarios put to them, these seasoned executives demonstrated a clear
tendency to make decisions without relying on all of the information provided.

7.1 Strengths, Limitations, and Future Research Directions
Finkelstein and Hambrick [13, p. 68] were among the first to advocate the use of experimental methods to “tap
managers' cognitions.” This study responds to this call by utilizing an experimental method that literally captures

the decision policy of the managers. Policy-capturing is a particularly appropriate method to use here, as we are
seeking to understand how the participants combine environmental cues to make their decisions. We used the
results from practicing top executives as the basis for our conclusions. Importantly, the analysis is based on a
self-revealing experimental design approach versus a self-reporting survey approach.
A limitation of the study is the inclusion of a relatively small set of relevant factors. In the pilot study, we initially
included an additional factor that increased significantly the necessary number of scenarios. We determined
that the additional time and fatigue factor would substantially reduce the participation rate of the busy
executives who were being asked to take part on a voluntary basis as well as the quality of answers from those
who would participate. This limitation suggests that future research could use other factors in a series of
exercises done over a period of time with a motivated population of executive candidates to determine factors
relevant to a particular decision context. As discussed further below, a health care context would be an example.
We have not considered whether there could be different findings for decision-makers in different cultures,
different from the U.S./Western culture context of our study. Future research could proceed in the direction of
answering our research questions for distinct cultures based on comparative analyses across them. Perhaps
there are different information needs or usages across cultures with attendant DSS design and development
challenges that are culture specific (see [86] for instance).
We have used linear regression analysis to analyze the individual policy-capturing data sets drawn from the
participants to understand how the factors were combined to produce judgments. Kline and Sulsky [87]
suggested ways to incorporate nonlinear effects into the analysis. Other methods such as fuzzy sets and fuzzy
measure theories using Sharpley values have been proposed recently as an alternative way to interpret the
policy-capturing data allowing for nonlinear, non-compensatory effects [88]. To illustrate, fuzzy models were
built and tailored to the data set produced in our study, based on an early working version [89, 90] of this paper.
In a follow-up study, it is shown how further insight can be gained by examining the degree of
conjunction/disjunction evidenced in the combining of the decision factors based on veto and favor indices [91].
As a further research direction, we foresee building on our findings to accommodate notions of multi-participant
decision-making. Chen et al. [92] considered cases where multiple executives and one or more DSS collaborate
to make a decision. Torsten and Katsikopoulos [93] extended an established “fast and frugal” heuristic to a
group decision context. They found that group members who can use the heuristic tend to be more influential in
the group decision process than members who cannot use the heuristic.

7.2 Implications for Decision Support

These results have practical implications for decision support. Executives bemoan the overabundance of data
and the challenge of mining the data for information and eventual insights to support decision-making. Business
intelligence, under its many definitions, promises to bridge the gap from data to decisions for the executive.
Ackoff [40, p. B148] stated that “most managers receive much more data (if not information) than they can
possibly absorb… . Most MIS designers ‘determine’ what information is needed by asking managers what
information they would like to have. This is based on the assumption that managers know what information
they need and want it.” Playing it safe, the manager asks for everything (much like the approximately equal
average scale scores the executives assigned the four factors both before and after their participation in the
exercise), and the designer playing it safe provides “even more of everything.” The result of their caution is to
increase the twin overabundance of irrelevant information. Ackoff suggested that when a manager cannot use
the information because of the complexity of the decision process, he or she should be provided with either
decision rules or performance feedback. The intended result is an adaptive executive-machine system whose
accuracy and generality continuously increases adaptive thinking [94, 95].

Ackoff [40, p. B-154] posited that for situations for which adequate decision models can be constructed, but
from which optimal solutions cannot be extracted, some kind of “heuristic or search procedure should be
provided even if it consists of no more than computerized trial and error.” The model then specifies what
information is required. When adequate models have not been constructed, there is a need to research what
information is relevant. “If decision-making cannot be delayed for the completion of such research or the
decision's effect is not large enough to justify the cost of research, then judgment must be used to ‘guess’ what
information is relevant. It may be possible to make explicit the implicit model used by the decision-maker and
treat it as a model (for future decision support).” Simulation of the decision situation is mentioned as a possible
antidote. Ackoff's prescience seemed to anticipate policy-capturing as a natural mechanism. Kline and Sulsky
[87, p. 402–403] observed:
The results of a policy-capturing analysis are potentially useful for providing policy-makers with
corrective cognitive feedback [96]. Thus, for example, a physician could be given hypothetical profiles of
patients with a constellation of information regarding symptomatology, and judgments about the
likelihood of disease would be required based on the information contained in the profiles. The
physician could be given feedback on how they weighted the cues, their reliability, departures from
linearity, etc. Additionally, the physician could be provided with information on how the various cues
actually predict the disease in actual patients. Providing such environmental feedback may alter how the
physician makes future decisions (i.e., a revision in decision policy). In sum, cognitive feedback
represents a promising avenue for the application of policy-capturing (see [97] for a more detailed
treatment of the use of cognitive and environmental feedback.)
Accordingly, we see the need to make the construction of business intelligence and, more generally, DSS an
organic process, growing and evolving with the need for and use of information by executives—with provision
for the aforementioned cognitive and environmental feedback—and being capable of natural reorganization as
the decision needs change. Applications of policy-capturing can meet these needs. Indeed, consider what must
be the first description of a business intelligence system by Luhn [98, p. 315]:
One of the most crucial problems in communication is that of channeling a given item of information to
those who need to know it. Present methods of accomplishing this are inadequate and the general
practice is to disseminate information rather broadly to be on the safe side. Since this method tends to
swamp the recipients with paper, the probability of not communicating at all becomes great. The
Business Intelligence System provides means for selective dissemination to each of its action points in
accordance with their current requirements or desires. This is accomplished by the mechanical creation
of profiles reflecting the sphere of interest of each point and by updating these profiles as dictated by
changes in the attitude of the respective action points and as recorded by the system on the basis of
certain transactions.
This emphasis on finding out what is needed (and by whom) is consistent with our research implications, which
suggest that for a DSS to be used and found useful it must be able to efficiently and selectively provide
information on what environmental cues are really used rather than what are thought to be useful. Our
emphasis on decision policy capture complements Luhn's notion of action-point profiles. As he noted, this is a
continual discovery process of the evolving profiles of decision-makers occupying the associated action points.
Interestingly, this is an element of the general DSS architecture laid out by Holsapple and Whinston [99].
These notions are in concert with the conclusions by Kuo [100, p. 95] concerning design of effective Executive
Support Systems (ESS): “The articulation of information needs is often an afterthought, a justification arisen
after the manager has already made the decision. Furthermore, this articulation may not reveal the total picture
of the manager thinking. In particular, the articulation may ignore two facts: the knowledge used in intuition is

socially constructed, and the mental models will almost inevitably be incomplete. Hence, the ESS designer must
expand the analysis to include the examination of the managers' environment, their acts, and the consequences
of these acts.” Chen and Lee [101, p. 159] proposed a cognitive decision support system and provide a prototype
based on retrospective, introspective, and prospective supporting nodes, each with decision support functions,
stating that: “Rather than focusing on the executive's information need on ‘critical success factors' and the need
for specific decision support, this research emphasizes the need to support the executives’ thinking process.”
Finally, managers must be responsible for participating in the design of the system that is to serve them.
Otherwise, as Ackoff warned, their system “is likely to abuse them.” The message abides. Reporting on a
successful case study of an evolutionary approach to DSS design in an intuition-dominated domain, Eliashberg et
al. [102, p. 9] concluded that: “a critical aspect of the development process was maintaining managerial
involvement in the model development process and accommodating their needs. As the system evolved over
time, we learned more about managers' constraints and assumptions and built them into the model.”
The essential message is that the hope of achieving the great promise of business intelligence systems rests in a
deep understanding of the intersection of human intelligence as an adaptive toolbox and how it plays out in the
human-machine interface. The designed support systems must allow decision-makers to proceed in their own
idiosyncratic way to combine their particular cognitive abilities and ecological rationality within the relevant
environment.
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Notes
Aaron Sackett quoted in: “Where Did the Time Go? Do Not Ask the Brain,” The New York Times, by Benedict
Carey, Jan. 4, 2010, and co-author of the study [1].
2
Although it would be an unnecessary digression to discuss it at length here, the Austrian school of economics is
very heavily dependent on observations about individual human behavior (see [17] for instance). We are
indebted to an anonymous referee for calling our attention to this reference.
3
A pilot study was conducted with senior executive volunteers to examine the feasibility of the exercise. The
executives agreed that the factors used affected their judgment and were therefore meaningful for the
exercise. Moreover, they reported there was not much difficulty in following the instructions and that
the exercise did not take an inordinate amount of time to complete. Evaluating the scenarios was
difficult in the beginning; hence, the warm-up scenarios were deemed necessary.
4
Additional analysis was done by pooling all the data from the exercise for all respondents to generate a pooled
regression model. All the factors were found to be significant (p < 0.001).
1
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APPENDIX A: INSTRUCTIONS FOR INVESTMENT EXERCISE
You are asked to respond as a decision-maker considering strategic investment in telecommunications
infrastructure. Your likelihood of investing is assumed to be related to a combination of four conditions:
Anticipated Market Turmoil; Integration and Interaction with Supply Chain Partners; Information Systems
Sophistication and Maturity; Business and Organization Transformation. A brief description of the conditions is
provided below:

Anticipated Market Turmoil
Market turmoil is a characterization of the anticipated business environment. This refers to the rate of change in
the industry, degree of threat from competitors, change of customers' taste and demand, and the variety in the
product offered to the market.

Integration and Interaction with Supply Chain Partners

This refers to the current level of interaction and integration between the organization with upstream and
downstream supply chain partners in activities where information exchange between the groups will assist the
participating organizational units in forecasting, operation, and other business-related activities in order for the
organization to be effective and efficient.

Information Systems Sophistication and Maturity
This refers to the current level of technological sophistication of the organization. It can be measured by the
capability of the organization to efficiently accept and adopt an emerging technology based on the human and
technical resources in the organization.

Business and Organization Transformation

This refers to the current level of restructuring of the activities and relationship of the various organizational
units. The level of transformation can range from low (such as localized and internal integration) to high (such as
business process redesign that involves several different levels of the hierarchical structure of the organization).
To frame the discussion, the type of telecommunications infrastructure investment considered is described as
the organization network that enables large-scale computing, shared databases, and other IT applications. It is
created specifically to advance strategic objectives and achieve competitive advantages focusing on cost
leadership, market growth, strategic alliance, product innovation, and differentiation. The magnitude of the
investment is estimated to be at least $10 million.

APPENDIX B: DEMOGRAPHICS OF RESPONDENTS
Table
Job Title
CEO, President, Owner
CFO, VP, SVP – Finance
CIO, VP, SVP – IS/IT/Telecommunications
COO, VP, SVP – Operations/Logistics
Director, Senior Manager – IS/IT/Telecommunications
VP, SVP – Corporate Strategy and Development
Industry Sector
Manufacturing
Finance
Utilities
Wholesale/Retail
Computers/Communications
Health care
Travel
Others
Information Technology Budget
< $1 million
> $1 million and < $4.9 million
> $5 million and < $9.9 million
> $10 million and < $49.9 million
> $50 million and < $99.9 million
> $100 million
No response

8%
2%
46%
7%
18%
11%
31%
16%
10%
12%
11%
3%
6%
10%
5%
6%
6%
19%
10%
51%
2%

APPENDIX C: HISTOGRAMS OF WEIGHTS DERIVED FROM DECISION-MAKING
EXERCISE AND FROM DIRECT QUESTIONING
Figure A A Histograms of the weights (derived from policy-capturing) for each factor.

Figure B B Histograms of the subjective weights (from direct questioning) for each factor

APPENDIX D: PLOTS OF BETA WEIGHTS OF CLUSTER 1 VERSUS CLUSTER 2
Cluster 1 ○: HIGH risk-seeking propensity, HIGH innovativeness
Cluster 2 ▴: LOW risk-seeking propensity, LOW innovativeness

APPENDIX E: NON-RESPONSE ANALYSIS
Non-response analysis was conducted to ascertain whether the respondents differed systematically from nonrespondents. Two procedures were used. The first procedure analyzes data from early responses with those

from late responses, as suggested by Babbie [84], by using a late response as a proxy for a non-response. The
first third of the data collected from executives were compared with the last third; the intermediary responses
were discarded for purposes of the test to ensure a clean separation of the early responses/informants and the
late responses/informants. Using a dummy variable to represent early versus late responses did not yield any
statistical influence (p > 0.1) in the analysis. Although it is not direct evidence, this suggests that nonrespondents (latecomers as surrogates) do not differ from respondents in the importance of the factors in the
decision-making exercise. A second test for non-response bias explored possible differences between the nonresponding and responding organizations in terms of IT budget and industry affiliation. A chi-square test of
homogeneity using a contingency table [85, p. 519] was performed to compare IT budgets and industry
affiliations of respondents versus non-respondents. The objective was to test whether the distribution of the
data between non-respondents and respondents was alike, or homogeneous, in each category. The distribution
of industry types and IT budgets of the organizations from the non-respondents did not differ significantly (p >
0.1) from that of the respondents. Pearson's chi-square test for goodness of fit also was also conducted to
determine if there were reasons to believe that the proportions of industry categories representing the
responses differed from those of the sample frame developed for the experiment. The proportion of industry
types from responses did not differ significantly (p > 0.1) from that of the sample. Therefore, these tests
uncovered no evidence of non-response bias.

